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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Is this tribunal a representative example of the federal district
courts in the South, or is it merely an atypical, isolated case? Dis-
turbingly, the answer is not readily available, for few district courts
would be so forthright as to record permanently such hostility. Be-
cause it is difficult truly to appraise the situation among all the dis-
trict courts of the South, the Henry case can be used only to observe
the way in which the civil rights problem is being met in one particu-
lar jurisdiction. It is hoped that such an approach is not employed
elsewhere.
LAWRENCE M. BELL
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS - APPLICATION OF SECTION
137 N.I.L. TO CHECKS PRESENTED FOR PAYMENT
Checks drawn on defendant bank were deposited in Casper Na-
tional Bank to the payee's credit. The checks were mailed to defend-
ant for collection, and after retaining them for a period exceeding
twenty-four hours it refused to make payment. During this period
Casper suffered losses on these checks through check-kiting opera-
tions.' Plaintiff, as Casper's subrogee, sought recovery under sec-
tion 137 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
Section 137 provides:
Where a drawee to whom a bill is delivered for acceptance... refuses
within twenty-four hours after such delivery . . . to return the bill ac-
cepted or non-accepted to the holder, he will be deemed to have accepted
the same. (Emphasis added.)
Since the interpretation of this section has resulted in a great deal
of conflict among the courts, this court was confronted with two im-
portant issues: (1) does this section extend to checks presented for
payment or collection, and (2) if the answer to (1) is in the affirma-
tive, does the mere retention of the instrument for a period exceeding
twenty-four hours constitute a refusal to return, i.e., constructive ac-
ceptance ? The court declared itself in accord with those courts which
refuse to apply section 137 to checks and other demand bills unless
the presentment is for acceptance, and not for payment.3  Nonethe-
less, the court did discuss the second issue, stating that there could
not be acceptance until the drawer's account was charged and the ac-
count of the remitting bank credited. Mere retention, in and of
itself, was not constructive acceptance.4
1. Check-kiting is a method used to cover the theft of cash. Here, the payee had no deposits
or insufficient deposits in defendant bank and deposited the amounts in Casper National Bank.
Later, he withdrew the amounts deposited before the checks had cleared the defendant bank.
2. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Idaho Bank & Trust Co., 173 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. Idaho 1959).
3. Id. at 71.
4. Id. at 72.
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The court's view on the first issue has been sustained by a num-
ber of courts on the following theories:
(1) The section speaks of acceptance, not payment, and these words
have different meanings. Payment extinguishes the debt and puts an
end to the paper evidencing the same. Acceptance, on the other hand,
creates a new liability upon the acceptor and gives new life to the in-
strument.5
(2) Checks are invariably presented for payment, and presentment
for payment cannot be made until the instrument is due. Instruments
delivered for acceptance, however, must be delivered before maturity.6
(3) When a check is presented to the drawee, he must accept it or
refuse it. In the ordinary sense of the word "accept," this means that
the drawee must take or receive the check before he makes payment 7
However, in the legal sense, the acceptance referred to in section 137 is
that acceptance described in section 132 of the N.I.L.,8 and it has no
applicability to checks presented for payment.9
In addition to the above views, a few states have amended section
137, excluding its application to checks under any circumstances. 10
Since the above courts refuse to include checks presented for payment
within the meaning of section 137, they do not consider the second
issue. Instead, these courts leave to the holder only his common-law
remedy for breach of contract or conversion.
Wisner v. First National Bank of Gallitzin1 is the leading case
propounding the opposite view on these two issues. Here, the
drawee bank retained the checks for two days before refusing pay-
ment. The court held that section 137 was applicable to checks since
there was nothing in the N.I.L. which expressly excluded checks from
the meaning of that section. In fact, 9ection 185 of the N.I.L.12
would indicate that checks are subject to the provisions of section
13 7 .13 In considering the second issue, the court held that there was
a conclusive presumption that the holder made a demand for the re-
turn of the check after the twenty-four hour period had elapsed;
therefore, the drawee's mere retention of the check after that period
5. Urwiller v. Platte Valley State Bank, 164 Neb. 630, 83 N.W.2d 88 (1957); First Nat'l
Bank v. Talley, 115 Tex. 591, 285 S.W. 612 (1926).
6. First Nat'l Bank v. Whitman, 94 U.S. 343 (1876); First Nat'l Bank v. Whitmore, 177
Fed. 397 (8th Cir. 1910).
7. Kentucky Title Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Dunavan, 205 Ky. 801, 266 S.W. 667 (1924).
8. "The acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee of his assent to the order of
the drawer. The acceptance must be in writing and signed by the drawee...."
9. First Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 S.W. 856 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927).
10. KAN. GEN. STAT. ch. 52, § 1106 (1949); Mo. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 401.137 (1952).
11. 220 Pa. 21, 68 Atl. 955 (1908).
12. "A check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand. Except as herein
otherwise provided, the provisions of this act applicable to a bill of exchange payable on de-
mand apply to a check."
13. Wisner v. First Nat'l Bank, 220 Pa. 21, 26, 68 Adt. 955, 957 (1908). The court did
not consider the fact that checks are usually presented for payment, whereas bills must be pre-
sented for acceptance.
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constituted a refusal to return, i.e., constructive acceptance.' 4 Shortly
after this holding, however, the Pennsylvania legislature overruled
this decision with an amendment to section 137.1' Nevertheless,
Wisner has been followed by a number of courts, with little or no dis-
cussion of the problems involved. 6
At common law, the mere retention of the instrument by the
drawee, unaccompanied by other circumstances, did not constitute an
acceptance. If the drawee refused to return the instrument upon a
request by the holder, he might be liable for breach of contract or
tortious breach of duty.'7 Of course, the drawee could also be liable
for an implied acceptance of the instrument." However, since ac-
ceptance imported the assumption of an undertaking, the mere physi-
cal possession of the instrument was not enough. 9 Acceptance could
only be implied from such conduct, custom, promise, or notification
which warranted the holder to understand that the drawee's retention
was an acceptance. ° In their interpretation of section 137, a number
of courts recognize these common-law principles. Therefore, the
drawee may be deemed to have accepted the instrument when he is
estopped to deny an acceptance,2' when he has retained the instru-
ment for a period exceeding twenty-four hours against the holder's
demand that it be returned, 22 or when his refusal to return is a will-
ful refusal.23 It is evident, however, that mere retention by the
drawee, unaccompanied by the above affirmative acts, would not
amount to a constructive acceptance.
Although it appears that the courts are split on their interpreta-
tion of section 137, the instant case is supported by better reasoning.
It recognizes that section 137 provides for constructive acceptance,
a remedy unknown at common law. Therefore, a strict interpreta-
tion of this section precludes its applicability to checks presented for
14. Id. at 29, 68 Atl. at 958.
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 326 (1930), "Provided that the mere retention of such bill by
the drawee, unless its return has been demanded, will not amount to an acceptance, and pro-
vided further, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to checks... "
16. Miller v. Farmer's State Bank, 165 Minn. 339, 206 N.W. 930 (1925); Blackwelder v.
Fergus Motor Co., 80 Mont. 374, 260 Pac. 734 (1927); Dawson v. National Bank, 196 N.C.
134, 144 S.E. 833 (1928); American Nat'l Bank v. National Bank, 119 Okla. 149, 249 Pac.
424 (1926); Mt. Vernon Nat'l Bank v. Canby State Bank, 129 Ore. 36, 276 Pac. 262 (1929).
17. Jeune v. Ward, 1 B. & A. 653, 2 Star. 289 (1818), where the court said that acceptance
is the engagement of the one party acceding to the proposition of the other; and that a refusal
by the drawee could not be deemed as acceding to the proposition.
18. Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Boettcher, 5 Colo. 185 (1879); Holbrook v. Payne, 151 Mass.
383, 24 N.E. 210 (1890); Overman v. Hoboken Bank, 31 N.J.L. 563 (Sup. Ct. 1864).
19. Hibbard v. Parciak, 94 Conn. 562, 109 Atl. 725 (1920); Mitchell Livestock Auction
Co. v. Bryant State Bank, 65 S.D. 488, 275 N.W. 262 (1937).
20. Westberg v. Chicago Lumber & Coal Co., 117 Wis. 589, 94 N.W. 572 (1903).
21. People's Nat'l Bank v. Swift, 134 Tenn. 175, 183 S.W. 725 (1915).
22. St. Louis Southwestern R.R. v. James, 78 Ark. 490, 95 S.W. 804 (1900).
23. Safety Motors, Inc. v. Elk Horn Bank & Trust Co., 118 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Ark. 1954),
aff'd, 217 F.2d 517 (8th Cit. 1954).
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payment or collection. The court also recognizes that the N.I.L.
has adopted the customs and rules of the law merchant, and where
the common-law rules have not been expressly abrogated by the
N.I.L., the customs of the law merchant govern. Therefore, in those
cases where section 137 is applicable, the drawee is charged with a
constructive acceptance only when his actions would have subjected
him to an action at common law for breach of contract, conversion,
or implied acceptance. Again, in considering policy factors, the court
realizes that a broader interpretation of the section would subject
our banking institutions to an undue hardship.
MARVIN DRONZEK
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